The cycle of violence

One of my favorite attitudes expressed in political discussions regarding Palestine is the moderately liberal approach that the central issue regarding Palestine is that the “cycle of violence” must be stopped. This argument is often invoked when somebody is approaching the issue with the intent of resolving it without knowing anything about it. Anybody who might list other political reasons is met with the accusation that they are “part of the problem” and that their priority should be “stopping the cycle.” Usually, these people are extremely frustrated that the “cycle” of “senseless” violence continues despite their noble efforts to end it, leaving them with a self-vindicating sense of helplessness and powerlessness.

It might appear here that the cycle of violence itself is what induces these serious psychological issues in the failed messiahs in question. Moderately liberal people with certain sensibilities about violence never fail to fall victim to this complex at some point. But what is often lost here is that it is not a “cycle of violence” on the ground that renders their efforts ineffectual. Instead, it is the anti-”cycle of violence” mentality itself which induces the psychological trauma of hopelessness. It is not the situation on the ground which produces this politically impotent agent, but rather the attitude itself. In that sense, opposing the cycle of violence is a fascinating strategy that guarantees defeat for itself.

There are at least three assumptions or implications related to the approach of those concerned with ending the “cycle of violence” and all of them are easily refutable and will expose why the approach is inevitably a failure.

The first assumption is that violence is irrational. A “cycle of violence” is frustrating precisely because it is thought to be senseless, pointless, unproductive, inexplicable, incomprehensible, etc. The truth is that violence in this type of confrontation is almost always rational in that it is calculated for a particular goal. It can either be geared towards terrorizing a population (a method which has history much earlier than the French Terror) by attacking indiscriminately, or towards achieving specific goals by targeting specific military or political structures or personnel. An assassination, for example, is not senseless. Neither is an attack on a military checkpoint. They make sense. That is not to say that they are right or justified, only that they make sense according to somebody’s political logic.

The second implication (and also assumption) is that there is nothing else to the thing-happening in Palestine but violence. That is, the task before us today is simply to put together a ceasefire, to bring parties to the table and to have them talk to one another. Because of this assumption, it is impossible to understand the political agendas and motivations of any of the actors in Palestine and Israel. People who adopt this view cannot recognize any political goals as legitimate. The fact that millions of Palestinians are either in the diaspora or living in refugee camps, even in Gaza and the West Bank, carries little weight. The aspirations of these people to leave the refugee camps is denied because they should “look forward” and do what they can to “stop the violence.” In other words, certain rights should be abandoned for the sake of taking the “moral high ground” and ending the violence. Rights, an operative innovation of the liberal tradition, ironically are not important here. Neither is the reality that violence is not actually that definitive of the situation in Palestine and Israel. Over the past century, there have been intense periods of violence, as well as prolonged periods of relative peace. It has rarely if ever been the case that all encounters during a specific time period between opposing actors have been violent.

The third implication is that the elimination of violence is the only legitimate political goal in the world or, at the very least, that it is the most important political goal in the world. It is impossible in this view to consider politics in light of violence–the fact that violence is a political tool is overlooked. With that, as well (and this is related to the first assumption), is ignored the obvious implication that if violence is a political tool, it must be a tool of something: that something is what defines the real political battle which should gather the attention of the well-intentioned observer-messiahs. The important thing about this understanding is that the context of the political battle is ignored in the fight to end the cycle of violence, but that references to that political battle are deemed to be offensive in and of themselves precisely because it is believed that the mere acknowledgment of that political battle is productive of violence. The reference rather than the referent is violent. This third implication should not be taken too seriously, however, because it is an implication which never resonates with the one who believes in the cycle of violence; after all, these people often justify violence in other scenarios while projecting their selectively pacifist views onto others inconsistently.

Those who believe in the “cycle of violence” are neither exclusively supporters of the Israeli apartheid framework, nor supporters of the Palestine 2-state framework. They are the moderately liberal elements of all of these groups, as well as other disinterested and unattached groups which are thought to be neutral. My point is that this approach, while it appears to be well-intentioned and noble, is at best fruitless and at worst dangerously neglectful. The dis-empowering effects that are engendered by the hopelessness that this approach produces do not stem from the realities of the world, but rather from the approach itself, which sets itself up to get wrapped up in itself. The goal of ending the cycle of violence can never be met because it treats violence as a cause of a problem, rather than an effect of one. In mocking this mission of ending the cycle of violence, however, I have actually suggested a more viable way to end the violence: to ignore it, and to focus instead on the political encounter.

  1. 10 Responses to “The cycle of violence”

  2. By annie on Dec 21, 2007

    On this excellent website you can read the interviews of israeli soldiers speaking of the violence they metted out in the OPTs

    http://www.cactus48.com/senatorjoe.html

  3. By Wassim on Dec 22, 2007

    I don’t want to blow your trumpet, but you deserve it. This post is a keeper. I’ve always had my finger on something like this but never been able to articulate it. At least not this good.

  4. By Tom P. on Dec 22, 2007

    what an excellent blog! even more thought-provoking than usual.

    I think that you are mainly referring to the “cycle of violence” talk in its most prevalent U.S form, which stems from viewing the conflict in Israel/Palestine as engendered by “non-Western” “irrational” attitudes. If only those crazy Middle Easteners were as cool-heeded as us Americans, this argument goes, things would be different. We just need to explain to them why violence is bad, and then they’ll see the light and progress towards peace.

    This is what I call the “soccer spectator” attitude, because it reminds me of how people I know watch TV soccer matches and yell orders at the players (”shoot at the goal!! make a pass”!!). The “advisor” ends up congratulating him/herself for being both more intelligent than the people receiving the advice (e.g. “I, the outsider, have noticed some obvious ways to respond to the occupation that never occurred to its victims”), and more moral than them (through this very cheap and selective pacifism, that demands no self-sacrifice or any real commitment, just some random advice).

    But things are very different in intra-Israeli debates. Take, for example, the situation in Sderot: only the other day the lives of dozens of schoolchildren were saved when a Qassam rocket hit an empty schoolyard. The children weren’t playing there, because they were directed not to play outside: it is too risky when the city has been constantly bombarded with rockets for the last seven years. This is not to ignore the ongoing crimes being committed in Gaza or the desperation that leads militants to shoot these rockets; my point is only that any activists wanting to remain relevant to the Israeli community cannot afford to ignore both the violence that these people are suffering from and the calls to escalate the violence towards the Palestinians to supposedly “deter the terrorists” (a solution that somehow sounds more and more realistic the more it ends up backfiring and making things worse).

    And it is in this context that Israeli activists end up making arguments about the “cycle of violence”: assassinating a militant and a dozen bystanders, demolishing the house of another (and of some of his neighbors), bombing an electricity plant that serves the whole of Gaza – all of these won’t help because they just sow the seeds for more violence. In Israel, responding violently is a constant topic of public debate, even when the Israeli state has many more options of behaving differently that the Palestinians have: Israel could decide to end the occupation and change the entire situation, not just the tactics both sides use (and this is a crucial point, that makes discussions of Israeli and Palestinian violence far from comparable). I agree that these arguments should be accompanied by an analysis of the political situation, as opposed to a narrow focus on the violence itself; but not making them at all, at least in the Israeli context, leaves the calls to increase violence unchallenged, which is not a responsible thing to do. In other words, we don’t have the option of ignoring the violence: even if we do, other won’t. We can only try and convince people that there are better alternatives.

  5. By yaman on Dec 23, 2007

    Thank you Wassim :)

    Tom, I’m definitely influenced by the soccer spectator attitude as you put it, but I don’t think it’s exclusive to that scene–there is also a logic that no political discussions can occur in a time of violence which plagues both the Israeli side (”we don’t need to talk to Hamas because as soon as they stop firing rockets, we will stop our incursions into Gaza”) as well as some on the Palestinian side (the hudna I think is based on this logic). It may be quite reasonable or violence to be considered as a political factor; it should be. However it should not be considered the only or primary factor because in and of itself, it is not a core political issue, only a tangential one. So, there is that important distinction. The more important one for me though, in trying to make sense of what I mean here in my post and how it relates to the very nuanced and important point that you made, is a distinction between political analysis and political developments. Violence certainly makes the latter difficult, if not impossible, for a number of reasons, practical, ‘political’ (as related to domestic politics), etc. A comprehensive analysis of the situation (as opposed to say, the reasons why it is difficult for political developments to occur) which treats violence as key, however, I would say is failed and unsound. That is what I was referring to in my post: those spectators who both not only see violence as the defining issue between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but also consider the mere mention of other political issues to be, in and of themselves, causes of violence, and thus find the solution to be a mutual putting-down of arms, and otherwise a satisfaction with the status quo.

  6. By Tom P. on Dec 23, 2007

    ok, that makes it clearer, and it shows the paternalistic logic behind the whole thing – “kids, daddy says to stop fighting”. If “they” only “sat down and talked”, surely all the interests that are driving the occupation would suddenly disappear and all would be immediately solved. This is how the government manages to push the settlement project forward, through a series of neverending peace talks that require neither any actual committments nor violence on too great a scale (which is bad for the economy).

    I only wish we had some Northern Ireland-style pressure from the outside, but I guess it’s up to us to generate that instead of bitching about it.

  7. By Randeep on Dec 31, 2007

    “This argument is often invoked when somebody is approaching the issue with the intent of resolving it without knowing anything about it. ”

    well said.

  8. By Yorke on Jan 22, 2008

    ‘An assassination, for example, is not senseless. Neither is an attack on a military checkpoint. They make sense. That is not to say that they are right or justified, only that they make sense according to somebody’s political logic.

    Time therefore to introduce a new logic – and a new reality?

    hhtp://yorketowers.blogspot.com

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